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LOCKOUTS AND THE LAW: THE IMPACT OF
AMERICAN SHIP BUILDING AND
BROWN FOOD*
Walter E. Oberert
Two recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with the bargaining lockout

and the use of temporary replacements during a multiemployer, defensive
lockout are analyzed and interpreted against the background of prior cases

and doctrines and in terms of implications for the future. The impact of the

Court's evolving "true motive" interpretation of sections 8(a) (1) and (3)

upon the Board's "balancing power" is also examined. The author concludes
with a discussion of four questions left unanswered by the decisions, involving the pre-impasse bargaininglockout, the hiring of temporary replacements after a bargaininglockout, the hiring of permanent replacements after
a bargaining or defensive lockout, and the bargaining lockout in firstcontract negotiations.
Any forager in the law is beholden to those who have traveled before
him. In the realm of lockouts the trailblazer is Professor Bernard
Meltzer. He has articulated a laissez-faire thesis concerning the bargaining lockout with such scholarly force as to leave magnetic markings.1
I am not alone among his readers. Nine men in Washington have also
been reading Professor Meltzer-if not directly, then derivatively. A
substantial majority of them have proved to be apt pupils. The evidence
of this appeared last March in the American Ship Building2 and Brown
Food' decisions. The Supreme Court held, in accord with Professor
Meltzer's cogent advocacy, although without express acknowledgment
and for somewhat expanded reasons, first, that a single-employer bargaining lockout, after impasse, was not an unfair labor practice; and,
second, that neither was it an unfair labor practice for the nonstruck
members of a multiemployer bargaining unit, who had locked out their
employees in response to a whipsaw strike, to employ temporary replacements where the struck employer had himself employed temporary replacements.
Before analyzing these two decisions, some historical perspective is in
order.
* This article is a slightly revised version of an address presented at The Southwestern
Legal Foundation's Twelfth Annual Institute on Labor Law, October 28-30, 1965, in Dallas,
Texas.
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
1 Meltzer, "Single-Employer and Multi-Employer Lockouts Under the Taft-Hartley
Agt," 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 70 (1956); Meltzer, "Lockouts Under the LMRA: New Shadows
on an Old Terrain," 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 614 (1961); Meltzer, "Lockouts: Licit and Illicit,"
N.Y.U. 16th Conf. on Lab. 19 (1963).
2 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
8 NLRB v. Brown (d/b/a Brown Food Store), 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
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BACKGROUND

At common law the lockout was a weapon implicit in the employer's
arsenal, unless, of course, he had relinquished it by contract.' An employer who could discharge or lay off at will could, by definition, lock out
at will. The various meanings attributed to the ambiguous term "lockout"
all entail permanent or temporary severance of employment. 5 The temporary withholding of employment in order to serve some interest of the
employer vis-h-vis his employees is the variety of lockout currently most
kinetic and therefore most pertinent for the purposes of this paper.
The Wagner Act of 19356 contained no reference to the lockout. It did,
however, in section 7,' establish the rights of employees to organize,
bargain collectively, and engage in concerted activities. These rights it
buttressed by creating the employer unfair labor practices of section 8.8
The right to strike was additionally and explicitly protected in section 13.'
4 E.g., Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Gee, 140 Fed. 153 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1905); Goldman v.
Cohen, 222 App. Div. 631, 227 N.Y. Supp. 311 (lst Dep't 1928); Moran v. Lasette, 221 App.
Div. 118, 120, 223 N.Y. Supp. 283, 286 (1st Dep't 1927) ("Unless surrendered by agreement,
the right to lockout was correlative with the plaintiff's right to strike"); Dubinsky v. Blue
Dale Dress Co., 162 Misc. 177, 292 N.Y. Supp. 898 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1936); see Annot.,
173 A.L.R. 674 (1948).
In Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45, 50 (7th Cir. 1908), the
court said:
[Ejmployers may lock out (or threaten to lock out) employees at will, with the idea
that idleness will force them to accept lower wages or more onerous conditions; and
employees at will may strike (or threaten to strike), with the idea that idleness of
the capital involved will force employers to grant better terms. These rights . . . are
mutual and are fairly balanced against each other.
5 Various usages of the word "lockout" are discussed, and pertinent authorities gathered,
in Trial Examiner Charles W. Schneider's Intermediate Report in Betts Cadillac Olds,
Inc., 96 N.L.RJB. 268, 282-83 (1951). See also Denbo, "Is the Lockout the Corollary of
the Strike?" 14 Lab. L.J. 400-01 (1963); Koretz, "Legality of the Lockout," 4 Syracuse
L. Rev. 251-52 (1953).
I National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136, Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1964).
7 Section 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1964), presently reads:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a) (3).
8 The provisions of Section 8, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964), most pertinent for the purposes of this paper presently read:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7 . . .
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization . . .
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees ....
9 Section 13, 49 Stat. 457 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 163
(1964), presently reads:
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The Taft-Hartley Act of 194710 added four sections which deal with
lockouts expressly but tangentially: section 8(d)(4)11 prohibits strikes
or lockouts, for the purpose of terminating or modifying a collective
bargaining agreement, until the prescribed notice period has run; section
203 (c)'I instructs the Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service to seek the settlement of disputes before resort to "strike, lockout, or other coercion"; sections 20613 and 208(a)14 authorize the President to deal with national emergencies caused by strikes or lockouts.
In reviewing the treatment of lockouts under these provisions, it is
helpful to have in mind the major purposes to which the lockout has been
put. They are: (1) to defeat an organizing effort; (2) to evade the duty
to bargain, as by undermining an incumbent bargaining representative;
(3) to avoid peculiar economic loss or operational difficulty resulting
from a partial strike or threatened by an imminent strike; (4) to protect
a multiemployer bargaining unit from fragmentation through the whipsaw
strike; (5) to drive a better bargain in the process of negotiating a
collective agreement.
Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed
so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike,
or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.
10 Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1964).
11 Section 8(d), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d), (1964), reads in pertinent

part:
[W]here there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract . . . the duty to bargain
collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify
such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification(1) serves a written notice upon the other party . . . of the proposed termination
or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof [and] . . .
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all
the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after
such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs
later ....

Section 203(c), 61 Stat. 153 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 173 (1964), reads in pertinent part:
If the Director is not able to bring the parties to agreement by conciliation within
a reasonable time, he shall seek to induce the parties voluntarily to seek other means
12

of settling the dispute without resort to strike, lock-out, or other coercion .

. .

. The

failure or refusal of either party to agree to any procedure suggested by the Director shall
not be deemed a violation of any duty or obligation imposed by this Act.
1a Section 206, 61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 176 (1964), reads in pertinent part:
Whenever in the opinion'of the President . . . a threatened or actual strike or
lock-out affecting an entire industry or a substantial part thereof engaged in [interstate commerce] . . . will, if permitted to occur or to continue, imperil the national
health or safety, he may appoint a board of inquiry to inquire into the issues involved in the dispute and to make a written report to him . ...
14 Section 20S(a), 61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 178(a) (1964), reads in pertinent
part:
Upon receiving a report from a board of inquiry the President may direct the
Attorney General to petition any district court of the United States having jurisdiction
of the parties to enjoin such strike or lock-out or the continuing thereof, and if
the court finds that such threatened or actual strike or lock-out(i) affects an entire industry or a substantial part thereof engaged in [interstate
commerce] . . . and

(ii) if permitted to occur or to continue, will imperil the national health or
safety, it shall have jurisdiction to enjoin any such strike or lock-out, or the continuing thereof ....
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The National Labor Relations Board and the reviewing courts had
early opportunity to pass upon the legality of lockouts in the first two
categories-those employed for the patently antistatutory objectives of
defeating an organizing effort or evading the duty to bargain. Such
lockouts were held unlawful.15 These rulings, premised securely on what
are now sections 8 (a) (1), (3), and (5),1" have never been questioned.

More vexing have been the problems presented in the other three lockout categories, all of which have some bearing on the American Ship
Building and Brown Food cases. Accordingly, the developments in these
three areas will be briefly outlined for background purposes.
Lockouts To Avoid PeculiarEconomic Loss
Lockouts which are designed to protect the employer from peculiar
economic loss or operational difficulty, i.e., hardship not usually suffered
by an employer subjected to a strike, have many times been held lawful
by the NLRB." The Board succinctly stated its doctrine in Quaker State
Oil,'8 where it said: "lockouts are permissible to safeguard against unusual
operational problems or hazards or economic loss where there is reasonable ground for believing that a strike was threatened or imminent. The
burden of going forward with the evidence to justify the lockout rests on
the [employer]. "19
We may better understand this "economic justification" doctrine by
reviewing the Board's three most frequently cited and illustrative applications of it.
In Duluth Bottling2 9 the purpose of the employers in locking out in the
face of a notice of impending strike was found to be the prevention of
the spoilage of materials threatened by a sudden shutdown. Accordingly,
the lockout motive was pure. It was "to avoid the peculiar economic loss
rather than
which would have been a fortuitous incident of a strike,'
the unlawful purpose of interfering with concerted activities of the
employees.
15 E.g., NL1RB v. Somerset Classics, Inc., 193 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Cape
County Milling Co., 140 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1944); NLRB v. National Motor Bearing Co.,
105 F.2d 652, 657-58 (9th Cir. 1939); NLRB v. Hopwood Retinning Co., 98 F.2d 97
(2d Cir. 1938). See also Note, "Permissibility of Lock-Outs, Shut-Downs and Plant Removals," 50 Colum. L. Rev. 1123 (1950).
16 For the texts of these sections, see note 8 supra.
17 The Board's "economic justification" doctrine has been searchingly examined, and
criticized for its narrowness in excluding the bargaining lockout, by Professor Meltzer in
the three articles cited note 1 supra.
18 Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 334 (1958), enforced, 270 F.2d 40 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 917 (1959).
19
20
21

121 N.L.R.B. at 337-38.
Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.LR.B. 1335 (1943).
Id. at 1336.
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Again, in InternationalShoe 22 the purpose of the lockout was found to
be to protect against intermittent work stoppages which made further
operations in an integrated plant "uneconomical." 23
And in Betts Cadillac24 the purpose of the lockout by the nonstruck
employers in a multiemployer unit was found to be to avoid the customer
inconvenience and damage to good will which would have resulted from a
sudden broadening of the strike so as to catch disassembled cars in the
nonstruck employers' repair shops. The law does not require, the Board
held, "that the employer caught in strike activity must be a sitting duck,
stripped of his power to save himself from attendant loss or operative
disruption. ' 25 "The pedestrian need not wait to be struck before leaping
for the curb." 26
The logic of this "economic justification" doctrine is more compelling
the less one scrutinizes the cases giving rise to it. The logic runs like this:
(1) The law does not require an employer to continue to operate where
to do so makes no business sense. (2) A partial strike or threatened
strike may, in the particular circumstances, render further operations
sufficiently uneconomical to justify a temporary shutdown. (3) A shutdown in such circumstances is not a punishment for the exercise of section 7 rights and therefore unlawful, but is "defensive" in nature and
therefore privileged.
But a closer examination of the three "classic" examples of the economic justification doctrine, discussed above, will demonstrate how nebulous the line may be between good lockouts, which are "defensive," and
bad lockouts, which are "retaliatory." In Duluth Bottling we may properly ask what the loss through spoilage of materials would have been had
the soft-drink manufacturers not anticipated the threatened strike by
locking out. The facts were that the syrup from which the soft drinks
were made would spoil within one to five days after being poured from
storage drums into processing vats. By using up the syrup already in the
vats at the time the strike notice was received and then closing down, the
producers saved the cost of the syrup in the vats. How much did this
saving amount to? The intriguing answer is: from $100 to $300 per
employer. True, the trial examiner inferred that even this modest loss
held significance for the small producers there involved, but we may be
International Shoe Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 907 (1951).
28 Id. at g09.
24 Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951). A case much like Betts Cadillac
is Packard Bell Electronics Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1122 (1961), where a lockout for the purpose of ensuring that customers' television sets would not be tied up during a threatened
strike was held lawful.
25 Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., supra note 24, at 285.
26 Id. at 286. The two last-quoted statements in the text are from the Trial Examiner's
Intermediate Report, which was adopted by the Board. Id. at 269.
22
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permitted a little tongue in cheek in response to this inference, relegated
to the fine print of a footnote. 27 A more persuasive interpretation of the
case, looking through the form to the substance, is that on the total facts
it was evident that the employers were underdogs, caught in an unfortunate bargaining situation by a powerfully situated union, and that, in
locking out, they were rather innocent of any anticollective-bargaining
animus (although they quite apparently favored a switch by their employees from the Brewery Workers Union, and the intoxicating wage
pattern which that union had become accustomed to in representing beermaking employees, to the Teamsters Union which was subject to intoxication at lower rates28 ).

Similarly, in International Shoe the employer not only locked out all
its employees in response to recurrent strikes on the part of a few, but
also refused to reopen until first obtaining a no-strike pledge and an
"escape" clause in the maintenance of membership provision permitting
the withdrawal from the union of those who had joined after a certain
date. The union agreed to the no-strike provision immediately, but balked
at the escape clause. The employer's insistence upon the latter prolonged
the lockout by more than a month. Was it uneconomical operation which
motivated the lockout over this last month, or was it bargaining leverage?
The Board majority held it was the former. Two dissenting members said
it was the latter and that such a bargaining lockout constituted coercion
within the meaning of section 8(a) (1) and discrimination within the
meaning of section 8 (a) (3). Furthermore, the dissenters contended, since
the insistence upon the escape clause, unlike the no-strike clause, prolonged the lockout for reasons other than the assurance of stable operations, it was "in derogation of the basic policy of the Act to minimize
interruptions of commerce. 9
Again, in Betts Cadillac the most prominent reason given by the nonstruck car dealers who locked out their repair shop employees was not
that a sudden extension of the strike to them would risk the entrapment
of customers' cars in their shops, but rather that "a strike against some
was a strike against all." 0 The latter, standing alone, was no defense
at all for a lockout in this pre-Buffalo Linen era. And the General Counsel
strongly contended that it should be no defense on the facts of Betts
Cadillac since, he argued, the real motivation for the lockout was reprisal
27 Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335, 1359 n.50 (1943).
28 The Board in fact found that certain actions of the employers, other than the
lockout itself which was held lawful, in behalf of the Teamsters and against the Brewery
Workers, constituted violations of §§ 8(1), (3). Id. at 1336-39.
29 International Shoe Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 907, 914 (1951).
30 Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 NL.R.B. 268, 277-78, 288 (1951).
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for the exercise of the strike weapon against two of the car dealers. The
Board avoided this contention by holding that the burden of proof in
such circumstances was on the General Counsel, and that he had failed
to carry it.
Against this background, the difficulties with the logic of the economicjustification doctrine may become more apparent. As Professor Meltzer
has put it:
It is plain from these cases that the Board's distinction between "economic" and bargaining lockouts is difficult to administer. Furthermore, the
similarities between the two types of lockout seem to be more important
than their differences. Both types may involve losses to employees which
arise out of protected activities and may, therefore, discourage or diminish the effectiveness of such activities. Both types may also involve an
attempt to protect the economic integrity of the enterprise without any
attempt to frustrate organizational activity or to avoid the bargaining
process. The difference between these lockouts when they both arise in
the context of bargaining, namely that the bargaining lockout is designed
to reduce the union's pressure by depriving it of the initiative with respect
to the timing of the shutdown while the economic lockout is designed to
avoid the consequences of the union's exercise of its initiative, seems exceedingly slender.
The employer may make this distinction even more shadowy by choosing
his rhetoric carefully.3 ' [Emphasis added.]
Multiemployer and Bargaining Lockouts
The difficulty in distinguishing the "economically justified" lockout
from the "bargaining" lockout cast its shadow across the multiemployer
landscape. This was true because of the long resistance of the Board to
any effort to distinguish multiemployer from single-employer lockouts.
Each variety was subjected to the same test of legality, namely the
presence of economic or operational difficulty of an atypical sort and the
absence of antiunion animus. Thus, for example, in the Morand32 and
Davis Furniture3 cases the Board held lockouts by nonstruck members
of a multiemployer bargaining unit to be unlawful "reprisals" rather
than privileged "defensive" measures, where no justification existed other
than the desire to avoid the consequences of "divide and conquer" tactics on the part of the union. The Board's rationale was that the strike-even the "divide and conquer" strike-was a protected activity, and that
a lockout designed solely to diminish the effectiveness of such a strike
31 Meltzer, "Single-Employer and Multi-Employer Lockouts Under the Taft-Harfley
Act," supra note 1, at 76.
32 Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950), remanded 190 F.2d 576 (7th
Cir. 1951), on remand, 99 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1952), enforced, 204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953).
33 Davis Furniture Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 279 (1951), remanded sub nom. Leonard v. NLRB,
197 F.2d 435 (9th Cir.), on remand sub nom. Davis Furniture Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1016
(1952), enforcement denied sub nom. Leonard v. NLRB, 205 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1953).
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was part of what the strike was protected against. This bootstrap reasoning was sought to be reinforced through asserting that whereas the employees had need of the strike to correct an imbalance in bargaining
power, the employer had no countering need for the lockout because
(1) he had the right to hire replacements in response to an economic
strike, and (2) he had control over the terms of employment, in contrast
to the employees who could affect such terms only through concerted
activities."4 Moreover, to permit employers to lock out in response to
a selective strike would, as the Board viewed it, defeat the purpose of
Congress to allay industrial strife. As stated in Morand:
In this case, the effect of granting immunity to the discriminatory lockout by 34 employers [involving about 700 employees], in reprisal against
the strike against a 35th employer [involving only about 60 employees],
would be to multiply the obstruction to commerce. It would set a sweeping precedent for the conversion of any single employer's dispute into
an association-wide or industry-wide dispute. An isolated skirmish would
become a civil war. 5
To say that the reviewing courts were unimpressed by the Board's
position that the multiemployer temporary lockout in response to a whipsaw strike was unlawful would be the understatement of this paper.
The courts of appeals reversed the Board in every case in which review as
to this question was sought.8 Representative of some of the thinking of
these courts was the Seventh Circuit's statement in Morand that the nonstruck employers:
[C] ould quite properly ... view the strike... in the strategic sense [as]

against the entire membership of their Associations, aimed at compelling
all of them ultimately to accept the contract terms demanded by the
Union. It follows that they had a right to counter the strike's effectiveness
by... locking out their salesmen ....We so hold, not merely on the basis
of the implied recognition, in... Section 8(d) (4), of the existence of such
a right, but because the lockout should be recognized for what it actually
is, i.e., the employer's means of exerting8 7economic pressure on the union,
a corollary of the union's right to strike.
The Board resisted these judicial instructions until 1954 when the
Buffalo Linen38 case was presented to a new constituency. Even then,
84 See Davis Furniture Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1016, 1020-21 (1952).
85 Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 413 (1950). The Board was quoting

from the brief of the General Counsel.
36 NLRB v. Continental Baking Co., 221 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Spalding
Avery Lumber Co., 220 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1955); Davis Furniture Co., supra note 33;
Morand Bros. Beverage Co., supra note 32.
The only Board victory, which came in the second Morand decision, see note 32 supra,
was premised on a finding that the employers had in fact "discharged" their employees,
rather than merely locking them out temporarily. The employees were, however, reemployed after the dispute was settled.
3 Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 576, 582 (7th Cir. 1951).
38 Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954).
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it did only a partial about-face. It found the union's whipsaw tactic to
be for the purpose of atomizing "the employer solidarity which is the
fundamental aim of the multiemployer bargaining relationship. 3 9 Therefore, the Board majority said, "in the absence of any independent evidence of antiunion motivation, we find that the Respondent's [sic]
action in shutting their plants ... was defensive and privileged in nature,
rather than retaliatory and unlawful." 40 The majority hastened to add:
"Contrary to the assertion of our dissenting colleague, our decision
herein does not establish that the employer lockout is the corollary of
the employees' statutory right to strike. Upon the facts of this case, we
find it unnecessary to pass upon that issue."41 The majority wound up
by jamming the case into the "economic justification" pigeonhole:
We have done no more in this case than affirm ... that a strike by employees against one employer-member of a multiemployer bargaining unit
constitutes a threat of strike action against the other employers, which
threat, per se, constitutes the type of economic or operative problem at
the plants of the nonstruck employers
4 2 which legally justifies their resort
to a temporary lockout of employees.
The Second Circuit,4 8 with a nice irony, reversed the Board, thus
maintaining the Board's record for error on multiemployer, whiplash
appeals. Judge Frank first put a pin to the economic-justification balloon. The only grounds for this contention, he pointed out, were, first,
that the nonstruck employers could not feel safe in taking orders from
their customers because they might not be able to make deliveries, and,
second, that such employers could not feel safe in placing orders with
suppliers because they might lack employees to handle the goods when
they arrived and because the goods, even if delivered, might simply lie
dormant as depreciating inventory. This reasoning, Judge Frank said,
would apply as well to a single employer threatened with a strike, for
he, too, would be faced with the prospect of disappointing customers
or getting stuck with large depreciating inventories. Yet, as Judge
Frank noted, the Board inconsistently conceded that the single employer
would not be justified in locking out for such reasons.
Turning to the more difficult question of the justification of the lockout
as an effort to defend the multiemployer unit against whipsaw fragmentation, Judge Frank observed that "multi-employer bargaining has
never received the express sanction of Congress, ' 44 whereas Congress had
39 Id. at 448.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Id. at 448-49.
43 Truck Drivers Union v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956).
44 Id. at 117.
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expressly protected the right to strike. He summed up with the half-accurate prophecy that "the problems involved in legalizing the lockout in
multi-employer situations are manifold, and their solution must be left
to Congress.""
The Supreme Court, in its first real encounter with lockouts under
the act, reversed the Second Circuit and affirmed the Board.46 In a
unanimous decision it established these propositions: (1) that the act
did not make lockouts illegal per se; (2) that the legality of lockouts
was not confined to "unusual economic hardship" cases; 47 (3) that
Congress had tacitly approved multiemployer bargaining; (4) that the
member employers had a substantial interest in preserving such bargaining; (5) that Congress had committed the balancing of "conflicting
legitimate interests" of employees and employers "primarily" to the
Board, "subject to limited judicial review; ' '48 and (6) that "in the circumstances of this case" the Board had "correctly balanced the conflicting interests in deciding that a temporary lockout to preserve the
multi-employer bargaining basis from the disintegration threatened by
the ...

strike action was lawful."49

Two points about this decision deserve emphasis: First, the Court
did not attempt to delineate the outer bounds of lawful lockouts, expressly leaving open the question of "whether as a general proposition,
the employer lockout is the corollary of the . . . strike." 50 Second, the

Court expressly acknowledged the congressional commitment of strikelockout balancing primarily to the Board. As we shall see shortly, the
deference thus paid by the Court to this balancing function of the Board
was recaptured, with interest, in American Ship Building and Brown
Food.
American Ship Building: THE SINGLE-EMPLOYER
BARGAINING LOCKOUT
The essential facts in the American Ship Building51 case were these:
The employer operated ship-repair yards on the Great Lakes. The work
was highly seasonal, being concentrated in the winter months when the
lakes were frozen. Repairs in other seasons required great speed to avoid
undue immobilization of ships. The employer had previously executed
five collective bargaining agreements with the unions representing its
45
46
47
48

Id. at 118.
NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
Id. at 92, 97.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 97.

49
50 Id. at 93 n.19.

51 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
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employees, each agreement having been preceded by a strike. The last
contract expired on August 1, 1961. The requisite statutory notice of
intention to seek modification of the contract was given by the unions
on May 1, pursuant to section 8(d) (4) of the act. Substantial economic
differences developed during the negotiations. Proposals and counter
proposals were made, to no avail. Shortly before expiration of the contract, the unions proposed a six-month extension of the current contract,
or, in the alternative, an indefinite extension, negotiations to continue in
the interim. The employer rejected these extensions, fearing they might
result in a strike during the peak season or when ships were otherwise
in a yard for repair. On August 8, the unions announced an overwhelming rejection by their membership of the employer's last offer. On August
11, the employees were advised of layoff "until further notice."' , Violations of sections 8(a) (1) and (3) were charged. 3
The trial examiner, applying criteria with which we are now familiar,
found that the shutdown was "economically justified" even though partially motivated by a desire to break the bargaining impasse,5 4 as, in
fact, it did on October 27, when a new contract was executed. The situation was, in effect, Betts Cadillac on water.
The Board, by a three-to-two majority, rejected the conclusion of the
trial examiner that the shutdown was economically justified." The
Board's reason was its refusal to accept the trial examiner's conclusion
that the employer could reasonably anticipate a strike. The Board found
that certain oral assurances by union representatives were sufficient to
dispel any such apprehension.5" In such a situation, the Board concluded,
52 Id. at 304.
53 For the language of §§ 8(a) (1) and (3), see note 8 supra. The employer operated four

yards, but the complaint was limited to the Chicago yard. A violation of § 8(a) (5) was
also stated in the complaint, but "the Board made no findings as to this claim, believing
that there would have been no point in entering a bargaining order because the parties
had long since executed an agreement." American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 51,
at 306 n.5. Moreover, as the Court noted, the decision in NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Intl
Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960), upsetting the Board's determination that a slowdown or
partial strike during contract negotiations was a per se violation of § 8(b) (3), had direct
relevance to the § 8(a) (5) charge. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 51, at
306 n.5.
54 American Ship Bldg. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1362, 1381-83 (1963); American Ship Bldg.
Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 305 (1965).
55 American Ship Bldg. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1362 (1963).
56 The Board restated its requirement of a "real strike threat" as one of the elements
necessary to justify a lockout and applied this requirement to the facts of the American
Ship Building case in the following language:
[W]here the union has given the employer assurances that no sudden strike would be
called, or that, in the event a strike were called, adequate safeguards would be taken
by the union to protect the employer's facilities and work commitments during the
course of the shutdown, a lockout is illegal; for in such a situation the lockout is deemed
an offensive weapon intended to force the abandonment of the union's contract demands and the acceptance of the employer's.
Here, it appears that the Unions made every effort to convey to the Respondent
their intention not to strike; and they also gave assurances that if a strike were called,
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"the lockout is deemed an offensive weapon intended to force the abandonment of the union's contract demands and the acceptance of the
employer's.1' 5 7 The lockout was therefore coercive within the meaning

of section 8(a) (1) and discriminatory within the meaning of section
8 (a) (3).
The District of Columbia Circuit, in a per curiam decision,5" affirmed
the Board, concluding that it had simply performed the balancing function which the Supreme Court had expressly sanctioned in Buffalo
Linen.
The Supreme Court reversed,59 without a dissent but with two concurring opinions representing the views of three of the Justices. Justice
Stewart, writing for the majority, framed the question for decision as
follows:
What we are here concerned with is the use of a temporary layoff . . .
solely as a means to bring economic pressure to bear in support of the
employer's bargaining position, after an impasse has been reached. This
is the only issue before us, and all that we decide. 60
He then considered the alleged violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (3).
As to section 8(a) (1), he reviewed the Board's position that the lockout
interfered with the section 7 rights to bargain collectively and to strike.
"In the Board's view," he said, "the use of the lockout 'punishes' employees for the presentation of and adherence to demands made by
their bargaining representatives .
,.61This contention Justice Stewart
scotched on the ground that there was no allegation, no evidence, no
finding that the employer was hostile to collective bargaining or that the
lockout was designed to discipline the employees for banding together
to engage in it. The employer's sole intention was to secure modification
of the unions' demands. "We cannot see," Justice Stewart said, "that
this intention is in any way inconsistent with the employees' rights to
bargain collectively."6 "Nor," he added, "is the lockout one of those
any work brought into Respondent's yard before the strike would be completed.
The Unions further offered to extend the existing contract for 6 months, or indefinitely,
until contract terms were reached; in either case, the no-strike clause was to remain
in effect during the negotiations.
In these circumstances, Respondent, having refused to accept the Unions' assurances
that there would be no strike and having also rejected the Unions' offer to continue
the existing contract, cannot now claim that there was reasonable ground to fear that
the Unions would strike at some indeterminate date. Indeed, we find that there was,
in fact, no reasonable ground for such a fear.
American Ship Bldg. Co., supra note 55, at 1364. [Footnote omitted.]
57 Ibid.
58 Local 374, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
59 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
60 Id. at 308.
61 Ibid.
62 Id. at 309.
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acts which is demonstrably so destructive of collective bargaining that
the Board need not inquire into employer motivation, as might be the
case, for example, if an employer permanently discharged his unionized
staff and replaced them with employees known to be possessed of a
violent antiunion animus."66 (Citing Erie Resistor24 )
As for the claimed interference with the right to strike, "there is
nothing in the statute," Justice Stewart said, "which would imply that
the right to strike 'carries with it' the right exclusively to determine
the timing and duration of all work stoppages. The right to strike...
is the right to cease work-nothing more. '6 5
Accordingly, there was no violation of section 8(a) (1).
As for section 8(a) (3), Justice Stewart said: "It has long been established that a finding of violation under this section will normally
turn on the employer's motivation."66 Thus, if an employer discharges
a union leader who has broken shop rules, the question is whether the
employer has acted in defense of shop discipline or to damage employee
organization. In both cases the discharge is likely to discourage union
membership, but the first is lawful discrimination and the second unlawful. Again, some employer actions may be "inherently so prejudicial to
union interests and so devoid of significant economic justification that
no specific evidence of . . . antiunion animus is required."67 The employer's conduct might carry with it "an inference of unlawful intention so compelling" that the Board might "truncate its inquiry into
employer motivation. 66 (Citing Erie Resistor and Radio Officers.6 9)
But this lockout did not fall into such a category.
As for the Board's balancing function, so deferentially acknowledged
in Buffalo Linen, Justice Stewart said: "Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) do
not give the Board a general authority to assess the relative economic
power of the adversaries in the bargaining process and to deny weapons
to one party or the other because of its assessment of that party's bargaining power.1 70 Such would amount to the Board's "entrance into the
substantive aspects of the bargaining process to an extent Congress has
not countenanced. 71 (Citing Insurance Agents.72 ) Justice Stewart concluded with the following:
03 Ibid.

64
(5
66
67
68
69

NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 310 (1965).
Id. at 311.
Ibid.
Id. at 311-12.
Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).

70 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 65, at 317.

71 Id. at 317-18.
72 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 US. 477 (1960).
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The deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a
judicial inertia which results in the unauthorized assumption by an agency
of major policy decisions properly made by Congress. Accordingly, we hold
that an employer violates neither § 8(a)(1) nor § 8(a)(3) when, after
a bargaining impasse has been reached, he temporarily shuts down his
plant and lays off his employees for the sole purpose of bringing economic
pressure to bear in support of his legitimate bargaining position.73
Justice Goldberg, surely the most sophisticated member of the Court in
labor matters, took issue with the majority as to everything except the
result in a concurring opinion joined by the Chief Justice. In Justice Goldberg's view, the trial examiner was dead right in his conclusion that the
lockout was economically justified. The record made it "crystal clear,"
Justice Goldberg said, that the employer had locked out "in the face of a
threatened strike under circumstances where, had the choice of timing been
left solely to the unions, the employer and his customers would have been
subject to economic injury over and beyond the loss of business normally
incident to a strike . . . ."I (Citing, most pertinently, Betts Cadillac.75 )
The conclusion of the Board that the evidence did not support the trial
examiner's finding that the employer had reasonable grounds to fear a
strike was "irrational," without a "scintilla" of support in the record.76
The undisputed facts made it obvious, he said, that the employer could
reasonably fear that the unions' strategy was to "strike when the time
was ripe'1--4.e., when a ship or ships could be caught in a yard for
repairs. Each prior contract negotiation had entailed a strike. The assurances to the contrary of union representatives were simply what
one might expect, in the nature of "hopeful augury" rather than "binding
7
agreement."1
Justice Goldberg's approach to the case made it unnecessary to deal
with the "broad question" of the legality of the bargaining lockout.7 9
"The Court," he said, "should be chary of sweeping generalizations in
this complex area."8' Both the Court and the Board had "reached out"
in passing upon the legality of the bargaining lockout."' The problem of
lockouts requires, he said, "an evolutionary process," not a "quick, definitive formula."8 2
Moreover, the Court's requirement of an affirmative showing of anti73 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965).
74 Id. at 327.

75 Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 NL.R.B. 268 (1951).
76 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 73, at 335.
77 Id. at 331.
78 Id. at 333.
79 Id. at 336.
80 Id. at 338.
81 Id. at 341-42.
82 Id. at 336. Justice Goldberg was quoting Justice Frankfurter in Local 761, Int'l Union
of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 674 (1961).
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union animus in 8(a) (1) and (3) cases, except where the employer's
conduct was "demonstrably so destructive of collective bargaining" or
"so prejudicial to union interests and so-devoid of significant economic
justification" as to render such unnecessary, 3 did not square with precedent. The proper test, from precedent, he said, was "whether the business justification for the employer's action outweighs the interference
with § 7 rights ....,4 (Citing, for example, Republic Aviation.") This
test involves "the balancing of the conflicting legitimate interests,"
and this often "difficult and delicate responsibility" had been committed
by Congress "primarily to the ...Board, subject to limited judicial review."8 (Citing Buffalo Linen.)
Justice White wrote a separate concurring opinion, in which he, too,
strongly excepted to everything the Court had done but the ultimate disposition of the case. In his view, the case entailed no "lockout" problem
whatsoever; the issue was rather "whether an employer who in fact
anticipates a strike may inform customers of this belief to protect his
commercial relationship . . . and to safeguard their property, thereby
discouraging business, and then lay off employees for whom there is
no available work."8 7 This, he said, was precisely what had happened
in this case and what the trial examiner had found. He quoted the manager of one of the employer's yards to the effect that "the owner that
brought a boat into dock would have rocks in his head if he would have
taken the chance." 8 Justice White found nothing in the law to indicate
that an employer might not "truthfully inform his customers of a labor
dispute and his fear of a strike to protect his business and their property"
and then lay off his employees for "lack of work."8 9 Such a situation
is no lockout, he said, defining the latter as "the refusal by an employer
to furnish availablework to his regular employees."9 ° Accordingly, Justice
White also criticized the Court for "reaching out" to decide the bargaining lockout question "not at all presented by this case." 91 However, he
felt "constrained" by the Court's decision to state his views on the subject.9 2 These were in accord with the views of Justice Goldberg, but more
vehement. The Court's opinion he characterized as a "tour de force," entailing a misinterpretation of sections 8(a) (1) and (3), usurpation of
83 Id. at 339. These two different formulations of the test, quoted by Justice Goldberg,
appear in the opinion of the Court at pages 309 and 311.
84 Id. at 339.
85 Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
86 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 340-41 (1965).

87
88
89
90
91
92

Id. at 319.

Id. at 319-20.
Id. at 321.

Ibid. [Emphasis added.]
Id. at 322.

Ibid.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 51

the Board's balancing function, and a "truncated definition of the right
to strike . . . 2

Carried away by his outrage, he framed this picture

of what the Court had done:
If the Court means what it says today, an employer may not only lock
out after impasse consistent with §§ 8(a)(1) and (3), but replace his
locked-out employees with temporary help [citing Brown Food], or perhaps permanent replacements, and also lock out long before an impasse
is reached. Maintaining operations during a labor dispute is at least equally
important an interest as achieving a bargaining victory . . . and a shutdown during or before negotiations advances an employer's bargaining
position as much as a lockout after impasse . . . . I would also assume
that ... he may lock out for the sole purpose of resisting the union's as-

sertion of grievances under a collective bargaining contract, absent a
no-lockout clause. Given these legitimate business purposes, there is no
antiunion motivation, and absent such motivation, a lockout cannot be
deemed destructive of employee rights ...
The balance and accommodation of "conflicting legitimate interests" in
labor relations does not admit of a simple solution and a myopic focus
on the true intent or motive of the employer
has not been the determin94
ative standard of the Board or this Court.
Brown Food: Buffalo Linen "PLus"
The facts in Brown Food" were akin to those in Buffalo Linen with
these additives: (1) the struck employer exercised his right to hire
temporary replacements; (2) the nonstruck employers, who had locked
out their own bargaining-unit employees for the duration of the strike,
also hired temporary replacements. Agreement was reached on a new
contract within a month or so thereafter. The strikers and locked-out
employees were immediately restored to their jobs.
The Board,9" two members dissenting, found the situation not controlled by Buffalo Linen for the reason that, since the struck employer
was operating through replacements, no need existed for the non-struck
employers to lock out in defense of the multiemployer unit. "If," the
Board said, "in those circumstances they resort to a lockout and hire
replacements [rather than utilizing their regular employees, who, of
course, were willing to work on the employer's terms], it may be reasonably inferred that they do so not to protect the integrity of the employer
unit, but for the purpose of inhibiting a lawful strike. In short, the lockout in these circumstances ceases to be 'defensive' and becomes 'retaliatory.' ,M
The Tenth Circuit, in a two-to-one decision, reversed the Board. s
98 Id. at 323-24.
94 Id. at 324-25.
95 NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
96 John Brown (d/b/a Brown Food Store), 137 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962).
97 Id. at 76.
98 NLRB v. Brown, 319 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1963).
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There was no evidentiary finding of unlawful motivation, it said, and the
Board could not reasonably infer that "the act of hiring replacements,
per se," was retaliatory rather than defensive. 9
The Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of the Board, with Justice
Goldberg and the Chief Justice again concurring, and Justice White
this time dissenting.0'° Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, began
by agreeing with the Tenth Circuit that neither the lockout nor the continued operations by the nonstruck employers through the use of temporary replacements, whether "viewed separately or as a single act,"
constituted, per se, a violation of the statute. 101 He reiterated the propositions announced in American Ship Building with respect to sections 8
(a) (1) and (3), namely that "evidentiary findings of hostile motive"
are necessary to support a determination of unlawfulness except where
"the employers' conduct is demonstrably so destructive of employee
rights and so devoid of significant service to any legitimate business end
that it cannot be tolerated consistently with the Act." 0 2 This exception,
he said, was "but an application of the common-law rule that a man is
held to intend the foreseeable consequences of his conduct." 03 As an
example of such a situation, he cited Erie Resistor where, he said, the
"only reasonable inference that could be drawn by the Board from the
award of superseniority" to employees who worked during a strike
"-balancing the prejudicial effect upon the employees against any asserted business purpose-was that it was directed against the striking
employees because of their union membership; conduct so inherently
destructive of employee interests could not be saved from illegality by an
asserted overriding business purpose pursued in good faith."'10 4 The
conduct of the respondents did not come within this exception, since it
had a "comparatively slight" tendency to discourage union membership. 10 5
It analogized, Justice Brennan suggested, to the admittedly lawful efforts
of an employer to "blunt the effectiveness of an anticipated strike by
stockpiling inventories, readjusting contract schedules, or transferring
work from one plant to another, even if he thereby makes himself
'virtually strike-proof.' "106 Therefore, the conduct of the respondents
did not imply hostile motivation. Rather, the "compelling inference" was
"that this was all part and parcel of respondents' defensive measure to
0
preserve the multiemployer group in the face of the whipsaw strike."'

99 Id. at 10.
100 NLRB v. Brown, supra note 95.
101 Id. at 283.
102 Id. at 286.
103 Id. at 287.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.

108 Id. at 283.
107 Id. at 284.

7
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The most difficult obstacle in Justice Brennan's line of reasoning was
the claimed justification for the Board's inference of hostile motivation
based on the respondents' discriminatory refusal to use some of their
regular employees, who were willing to work, instead of temporary nonunion replacements. Justice Brennan circumvented this obstacle by concluding, in effect, that to require the use of regular employees would
force the respondents to help finance the whipsaw tactic. This, he said,
would "render 'largely illusory'
' 08

. . .

the right of lockout recognized by

Buffalo Linen.'
As for the embarrassing language in Buffalo Linen regarding the
Board's balancing function, this did not mean, Justice Brennan said, that
the reviewing courts were relegated to the role of "rubber-stamp," particularly where, as here, the question involved was not one of fact but of
an "erroneous legal foundation" upon which the Board's balancing of the
conflicting interests had been based."0 9 "Congress," he said, "has not given
the Board untrammelled authority to catalogue which economic devices
shall be deemed freighted with indicia of unlawful intent.""110
Justice Goldberg, joined again by the Chief Justice, wrote a concurring
opinion for the sole purpose of emphasizing that "this would be an
entirely different case had the nonstruck employers ... hired permanent
replacements even if the struck employer had exercised his right to hire
permanent replacements under the doctrine of""' Mackay Radio."' On
such facts, he said, a Board determination of nonjustification "might well
be controlling" "for Buffalo Linen makes clear that the test in such a
situation is not whether parity is achieved between struck and nonstruck
employers, but, rather, whether the employers' actions are necessary to
counteract the whipsaw effects of the strike and to preserve the employer
bargaining unit.""' This test was satisfied, Justice Goldberg agreed, by
the hiring of temporary substitutes.
Justice White, dissenting, found fundamental flaws in the Court's
disposition of the case. First, it unduly restricted the Board in dealing
with 8(a) (1) and (3) cases. Sufficient leeway must be afforded the Board,
in applying a statute "expressive of such large policy" and necessarily so
"broadly phrased," to find some employer conduct "sufficiently destructive of concerted activities and union membership" as to fall within
sections 8(a) (1) and (3) "notwithstanding that the employer has a
108
109

Id. at 285.

112

NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).

Id. at 291-92.
110 Id. at 292.
"'I Id. at 293.

13 NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 293-94 (1965).
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business0 justification for7 his actions."' 4 Republic
Aviation,"5 Buffalo
Linen," Erie Resistor,1 and Burnup & Sims1 18 had so decided. Second,
the Court's reasoning had a faulty premise, namely "that Buffalo Linen
gave the nonstruck employer ... a 'right' to lock out whenever a member of
the unit is struck so that a parity of economic advantage or disadvantage
between the struck and the nonstruck employers can be maintained.""' 9
"If this reasoning is sound," Justice White said, "the nonstruck employers cannot only lock out employees who belong to the union because
of their union membership but also hire permanent... nonunion replacements whenever the struck employer hires such replacements .... "I'
Justice White rejected this reasoning on the following grounds: (1)
Buffalo Linen established no unqualified "right" of employers in a multiemployer unit to lock out; it simply held that the Board was within its
authority in the balance it there struck. (2) The threat to the integrity
of the multiemployer unit on the present facts was not the same as in
Buffalo Linen since it could not be assumed that the struck employer
operating with replacements was at the "same disadvantage vis-h-vis
the nonstruck employers as the employer in Buffalo Linen whose operations were totally shut down by the union. Indeed, there was no showing
here that the struck employer was substantially disadvantaged at
an .... ,121. (3) Such disparity as existed in the present case was caused
by the unilateral action of the struck employer in resuming operations,
not by the union's whipsaw tactic. (4) The Court had so sanctified the
multiemployer unit as to license the nonstruck employers to refuse to
employ union men and to employ, instead, nonunion replacements,
the "prototype of- discrimination under § 8(a) (3)."122 Even struck employers had never been accorded this right of discrimination. "The
Court's justification for this invasion of employee rights by a member
of a multiemployer unit is the employer's right to burden the union strike
fund with all its members to bring economic pressure to bear on the
union. Unfortunately," Justice White pointed out, "this reasoning has
equal, if not greater, force in the single employer partial strike situation."' 23 (5) The "fundamental premise" of the Court "on which its
balance of rights is founded" was unacceptable-namely "that a lockout
114

Id. at 294.

115 Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
116 NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).

117 NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
118 NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964).
119 NLRB v. Brown, supra note 113, at 295.
120 Ibid.
121

Id. at 296.

122
123

Id. at 297.
Id. at 298.
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followed by the hiring of nonunion men to operate the plant has but a
'slight' tendency to discourage union membership, which," he added, "includes participation in union activities."'12 4
American Skip BuildingAND Brown Food
The major implications of the Supreme Court's decisions in American
Skip Building and Brown Food are these: (1) Sections 8(a) (1) and (3)
have been freshly defined so as to require specific evidence of the subjective existence of antiunion animus in the usual case, but it is not at all
clear where the line is to be drawn between usual and unusual cases.
(2) The Board's balancing function with respect to "conflicting legitimate
interests" has been curtailed, but it is not at all clear what the new
boundaries are. (3) The Court has itself struck a new balance in bargaining power between employers and unions through the validation of new
weapons for the employer, but it is not at all clear how far this impetus
will carry in subsequent cases.
In short, the decisions in American Skip Building and Brown Foodeven more so, the opinions-raise more questions than they answer. My
interpretation is as follows.
The primary impact of the decisions is upon the balancing power of the
Board. Prior to these decisions, the Board was authorized to find violations of sections 8(a) (1) and (3) on the basis of a balancing of the
legitimate employer interest served by a particular employer action
against the prejudice to expressly protected employee rights resulting
from such action. If, as a result of such balancing, the Board concluded
that the policy of the labor statute was more defeated than served by
the particular employer action, the Board was authorized to infer from
such action, without more, the requisite employer intention to do that
which was proscribed under sections 8(a) (1) or (3).'2 In such a situaIMPLICATIONS oF

Ibid.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S.
221, 228-30 (1963) said:
[Tihe employer may counter by claiming that his actions were taken in the pursuit of
legitimate business ends and that his dominant purpose was not to discriminate or to
invade union rights but to accomplish business objectives acceptable under the Act.
Nevertheless, his conduct does speak for itself-it is discriminatory and it does discourage union membership and whatever the claimed overriding justification may be,
it carries with it unavoidable consequences which the employer not only foresaw
but which he must have intended. As is not uncommon in human experience, such
situations present a complex of motives and preferring one motive to another is in
reality the far more delicate task . . . of weighing the interests of employees in concerted activity against the interest of the employer in operating his business in a
particular manner and of balancing in the light of the Act and its policy the intended
consequences upon employee rights against the business ends to be served by the
employer's conduct. This essentially is the teaching of the Court's prior cases dealing
with this problem ....
Justice Brennan further said:
Here, as in other cases, we must recognize the Board's special function of applying the
124
125
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lion the Board was not required to demonstrate independent evidentiary
support for its finding of unlawful motive. Moreover, the determination
of the Board on the basis of such balancing was subject to "limited
judicial review," as prescribed in Buffalo Linen.126
The concern evinced by the Supreme Court in American Ship Building
and Brown Food is the product of the nebulous character of the balancing
standard. In fact, it is hardly a standard at all, but rather delegates to
the Board a broad policy-making power most difficult of supervision
through judicial review, particularly the "limited" judicial review prescribed in Buffalo Linen. This kind of blank-check power for the Board is
especially troublesome where it is employed in passing upon the legality
of economic pressures not specifically prohibited by the statute which are
brought to bear by either side in the process of negotiating a contract. In
the exercise of such power the Board necessarily gets a thumb on the
bargaining scales and, to that extent, interferes with free collective bargaining. In the Insurance Agents 27 case the Court struck down the
Board's exercise of such power to render a slowdown or partial strike
during contract negotiations a per se violation of section 8(b) (3).28 The
two present cases in a sense declare, "What's sauce for the goose is sauce
for the gander."
What the Board has, in fact, been doing in seeking a rational exercise
of its balancing power with respect to sections 8(a) (1) and (3) is to
ask itself two questions: 9 First, how significant is the business interest
which the particular employer conduct seeks to vindicate? Second, to
what extent does this employer conduct prejudice expressly protected
employee rights? What the Supreme Court has done in American Ship
Building and Brown Food is to tighten the balancing standard by regeneral provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life, Republic Aviation
Corp. v. Labor Board, 324 U.S. 793, 798; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, [313
U.S. 177], at 194, and of "[appraising] carefully the interests of both sides of any
labor-management controversy in the diverse circumstances of particular cases" from
its special understanding of "the actualities of industrial relations." Labor Board v.
United Steelworkers, [357 U.S. 357], at 362-363. "The ultimate problem is the balancing
of the confficting legitimate interests. The function of striking that balance to effectuate
national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress
committed primarily to the . . . Board, subject to limited judicial review." Labor
Board v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96.
Consequently, because the Board's judgment was that the claimed business purpose
would not outweigh the necessary harm to employee rights-a judgment which we
sustain-it could properly put aside evidence of respondent's motive and decline to
find whether the conduct was or was not prompted by the claimed business purpose.
Id. at 236-37.
To similar effect, see Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 44-52 (1954).
126 NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957).
127 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
128 Section 8(b)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to refuse to bargain
collectively. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1964).
129 See, e.g., note 125 supra.
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formulating in more extreme, but nonetheless fuzzy, form the questions
to be asked and answered by the Board. In other words, it is still open to
the Board to hold a particular employer action violative of sections
8(a) (1) or (3) despite the absence of independent evidence justifying a
finding of antiunion animus. But it can only do so where the employer
action is so "inherently prejudicial" to (or "demonstrably destructive"
of) employee rights and/or "so devoid of significant economic justification" as to "carry its own indicia of unlawful intent." The Court's statement and restatement of the new test in the two recent decisions make it
unclear whether both inherently prejudicial impact upon employee rights
and lack of significant serving of legitimate employer interests are required before a violation of sections 8(a) (1) or (3) may be found. My
interpretation is that the requirements are disjunctive in the sense that it
is open to the Board to find a violation either because the action of the
employer which prejudices protected employee rights serves no significant
legitimate interest of the employer or because, even where it does serve
such an interest, it is so invasive of employee rights as to be inconsistent
with the purposes of the labor statute. Either one of these situations
would seem to provide rational support for an inference of unlawful
motive. In the first, the action of the employer is explainable more
rationally in terms of an antistatutory motivation than in terms of an
effort to protect insignificant employer interests 8 0 In the second, the
situation is precisely what it was in Erie Resistor, fulsomely cited in both
opinions of the Court as illustrative of a situation where independent
inquiry need not be made by the Board as to employer motivation. Since
the superseniority granted in Erie Resistor to replacements during an
economic strike was sought to be justified by the employer on the ground
that replacements could not otherwise be acquired, and since the Court
there approved the Board's refusal to inquire into the validity of this
employer contention,'' it would seem to follow that "inherent prejudice"
to employee rights, whatever this may mean,'1 32 is sufficient to render an

otherwise legitimate action of the employer unlawful. As Justice Brennan
33o If support is needed for this seemingly self-evident proposition, it may be found in
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945), apparently still viable. Further
support is found in this statement from Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Brown
Food: "When the resulting harm to employee rights is . . . comparatively slight, and a
substantial and legitimate business end is served, the employer's conduct is prima fade
lawful." NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 289 (1965).
.13 See note 125 supra.
122 Justice Stewart's view of what the Court means by such phrases is apparently quite
extreme. He states, writing for the Court in American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S.
300, 309 (1965):
Nor is the lockout one of those acts which is demonstrably so destructive of collective

bargaining that the Board need not inquire into employer motivation, as might be the
case, for example, if an employer permanently discharged his unionized staff and replaced
them with employees known to be possessed of a violent antiunion animus.
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put it in the Brown Food decision, Erie Resistor is "but an application of
the common-law rule that a man is held to intend the foreseeable consequences of his conduct."" 8 Justice Brennan's purpose in this attempted
accommodation was to square the embarrassing Erie Resistor precedent
(and many others) 134 with the Court's evolving "true motive" rationale
in 8(a) (1) and (3) cases. Whatever reservations one may have about
such a presumed intent, involving at worst a fiction and at best a preference of one motive over another in a mixed-motive situation, 8 5 the
Court seems to have accepted it.
Against the backdrop of the foregoing, we may now speculate as to the
disposition of four specific questions raised but unanswered in American
Ship Building and Brown Food.
(1) The Pre-Impasse BargainingLockout
The first question is: May the employer lock out for bargaining purposes before an impasse is reached and in the absence of any real threat to
strike? At first blush, this might not seem a lively problem since a shutdown for bargaining purposes before the need for such has crystallized
would appear to hold little attraction for employers. But, as a practical
matter, the question may be of importance. Suppose, for example, the
employer locks out for bargaining leverage under circumstances which he
interprets to constitute an impasse. Must he act at the risk of being found
by the Board to have made an erroneous judgment that an impasse
existed? Moreover, in some situations, delaying the lockout until an
anticipated impasse has actually crystallized may, because of the crucial
importance of timing in the particular case, be claimed to deprive the
employer of the value of the lockout.
The starting point for analysis of this pre-impasse lockout question is,
of course, American Ship Building. The "only" issue there decided by the
Supreme Court was that the bargaining lockout was lawful after a bargaining impasse had been reached. But Justice White, concurring in the
result for other reasons, decried as one implication of the majority's
reasoning that the employer could lock out during or even before negotiations since this would advance his bargaining position "as much as a
133 NLRB v. Brown, supra note 130, at 287. Justice Brennan went on to add: "conduct
so inherently destructive, of employee interests could not be saved from illegality by an
asserted overriding business purpose pursued in good faith." Ibid.
134 Justice White, concurring in American Ship Building, cites pertinent cases in conflict with the "true motive" rationale. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 132,
at 324. The cases cited are: Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) ; Radio
Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87
(1957); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); NLR.B v. Burnup & Sims, Inc.,
379 U.S. 21 (1964).
185 See note 125 supra.
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Given this legitimate business purpose, Justice

White said, there would be no basis for an inference of antiunion motivation, and the lockout, absent independent evidence of such motivation,
would be lawful. Justice White's projection of the logic of the majority is

forceful. While the Supreme Court has never held the bargaining lockout
to be the corollary of the strike,3 7 there is support for this proposition in
lower-court decisions 138 and among legal scholars.3 9 And, of course, if the
strike and lockout are to be treated as corollaries in the bargaining context, the lockout, like the strike, is lawful before or after impasse. Moreover, section 8 (d) (4)40 equates strikes and lockouts where the purpose is
termination or modification of an existing contract; a notice and waiting

period are required for each, but no express requirement of an impasse is
laid down. However, the design of section 8(d) (4) is quite clearly to deal

with bargaining impasses. In addition, the lockout, unlike the strike, is
not expressly protected in the act.

What, then, is the Board to do when it has this question of the preimpasse bargaining lockout presented to it? What it will want to do is
fairly predictable, namely to read American Skip Building narrowly. The

Board has always viewed the bargaining lockout as a Pandora's Box.
Underlying the interpretative concern over the impact upon expressly

protected employee rights has been a companion concern for the avoidance of "unnecessary" industrial strife. Equating the bargaining lockout
with the strike would create the risk of more industrial warfare, the Board
has reasoned, thus periling the most fundamental goal of the national
labor policy.' 4 Professor Meltzer and other critics of the Board's position
138 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 132, at 325. Justice Goldberg, who
also concurred in American Ship Building, took a more conservative view of the Court's
position on this question: "the Court itself seems to recognize that there is a difference
between locking out before a bargaining impasse has been reached and locking out
after collective bargaining has been exhausted, for it limits its holding to lockouts in the
latter type of situation without deciding the question of the legality of locking out before
bargaining is exhausted." Id. at 337.
137 The question was expressly left open in Buffalo Linen. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers
Union, 353 U.S. 87, 93 n.19 (1957).
138 See, e.g., Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 576, 582 (7th Cir. 1951),
quoted in text to note 37 supra. But, while vigorously asserting that the lockout was the
corollary of the strike, the Seventh Circuit seemed to require at the same time an exhaustion
of "the possibilities of good faith collective bargaining" (i.e., an "impasse") as a condition
precedent to the exercise of the bargaining lockout. Ibid. This position was reiterated in the
second Morand decision. Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 529, 531 (7th
Cir. 1953).
139 See, e.g., Brundage, "The Lockout and Multi-Employer Bargaining," 14 Lab. L.J.
976, 979 (1963); Denbo, "Is the Lockout the Corollary of the Strike?" 14 Lab. L.J. 400
(1963); Johannesen, "Lockouts: Past, Present, and Future," 1964 Duke L.J. 257, 260;
Meltzer, "Single-Employer and Multi-Employer Lockouts Under the Taft-Hartley Act," 24
U. Chi. L. Rev. 70, 81 (1956); Meltzer, "Lockouts Under the LMRA: New Shadows on an
Old Terrain," 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 614, 618 (1961).
140 See note 11 supra.
141 See text accompanying note 35 supra.

1966]

LOCKOUTS AND THE LAW

have challenged this premise on the ground that there is no way of knowing whether an enhancement of industrial strife would result; instead,
they have argued, validating the bargaining lockout might well, through
the counter pressure thus created, cause an actual reduction in time lost
in labor disputes by providing additional "motive power" for compromise.1' Moreover, the compromises thus resulting might tend to be less
inflationary and thus more in the national interest. I do not expect the
Board to be receptive to this line of conjecture, particularly in view of its
predictable and proper concern over the potential for camouflaged subversion of collective bargaining under the guise of "bargaining" lockouts.
But how is the Board to rationalize the result it will likely desire to
achieve? Obviously, it will be astute to discover any evidence independent
of the pre-impasse lockout from which to find, by inference if necessary,
the existence of an antistatutory motive. Failing this, it will have to
confront the old balancing problem in its new dress. The prejudice to
employee rights is obviously greater in degree, if only slightly, where the
bargaining lockout occurs before impasse than where it occurs after
impasse. For one thing, the employees cannot avoid such a lockout as
surely through concessions in bargaining which postpone an impasse. 4
Similarly, the employer interest served by the pre-impasse lockout is lesser
in degree, since, in view of the clear availability of the lockout after impasse when the real bargaining need has crystallized, a pre-impasse lockout may be deemed somewhat gratuitous and to that extent freighted with
the implication of impurity of purpose. 144
Moreover, the only mention of lockouts in the labor statute occurs in
sections 8(d) (4),145 203(c), 146 206,"'1 and 208(a), 141 all of which are
designed to deal with bargaining impasses. 4 9 Such implied licensing of
142 See, e.g., Meltzer, "Single-Employer and Multi-Employer Lockouts Under the TaftHartley Act," supra note 139, at 80, 90-91; Meltzer, "Lockouts Under the LMRA: New
Shadows on an Old Terrain," supra note 139, at 617-18.
143 Professor Meltzer would invert this concern: "That requirement [of an impasse before
resort to the bargaining lockout] involves troublesome evidentiary problems and might
also provoke union stalling in negotiations designed to deprive the employer of control over
the timing of a shutdown, which is the main advantage of the lockout weapon." Meltzer,
"Lockouts Under the LMRA: New Shadows on an Old Terrain," supra note 139, at 619.
144 Professor Meltzer, commenting upon the "inconsistency" of the Seventh Circuit in
Morand, see note 138 supra, in speaking of the lockout as the corollary of the strike while
at the same time seeming to require an impasse before resort to the bargaining lockout,
pertinently observes: "This inconsistency could perhaps be avoided by accepting the assumption, which is, however, somewhat fanciful, that in the absence of an impasse resort to a
lockout would necessarily be prompted by anti-union motivation." Meltzer, "SingleEmployer and Multi-Employer Lockouts Under the Taft-Hartley Act," supra note 139,
at 72 n.13.
145 See note 11 supra.
146 See note 12 supra.
147 See note 13 supra.
148 See note 14 supra.
149 Professor Meltzer emphasizes this point in arguing the legality of the bargaining
lockout. Meltzer, "Lockouts Under the LMRA: New Shadows on an Old Terrain," supra
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the bargaining lockout as may be derived from these provisions 50 may
therefore be argued to be limited to a situation where a bargaining impasse
exists. The fact that the lockout is equated with the strike in these provisions and that the pre-impasse strike is lawful does not necessarily answer
this argument, since the strike, unlike the lockout, is to no extent dependent upon the existence of these provisions, and the inferences to be
drawn from them, for its legality. Sections 13' 1 and 7152 afford the strike,
before and after impasse, express and independent protection.
Despite all of this, I do not believe that the pre-impasse lockout can be
safely treated by the Board as "carrying its own indicia of unlawful intent" within the meaning of the Erie Resistor exception to the requirement
of independent evidence of hostile motivation. My conclusion might be
different if none of the following factors were present: (1) a good-faith
belief by the employer that an impasse existed at the time of lockout; (2)
pre-impasse strike activity or the threat thereof; (3) a substantial lessening of bargaining leverage to be gained from the lockout because of a delay in resort to it until impasse; (4) some other, more exotic justifying
circumstance. In the absence of all of these factors, the most rational inference might be an antistatutory state of mind. How else explain the
timing of the lockout? But the very statement of the problem in this involved manner demonstrates the manifold factual contexts in which it
may arise and the dependence of a proper solution upon the particular
circumstances.
Whatever the Board does with the pre-impasse question, the courts of
appeals are likely to split. 153 Whether or not this is an accurate guess,
one court of appeals vote has, indeed, already been registered. In Detroit
Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 5 4 decided on June 3, 1965, the
note 139, at 618; Meltzer, "Single-Employer and Multi-Employer Lockouts Under the
Taft-Hartley Act," supra note 139, at 81 n.45, 82. "Section 8(d)(4) is specifically directed
at the situation of a bargaining impasse." Id. at 82.
150 The Court relied upon these provisions in American Ship Building: "The correlative
use of the terms 'strike' and 'lockout' in these sections contemplates that lockouts will
be used in the bargaining process in some fashion. This is not to say that these provisions
serve to define the permissible scope of a lockout by an employer." American Ship Bldg.
Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 315 (1965). The provisions were similarly relied upon in
Buffalo Linen: "The unqualified use of the term 'lock-out' in several sections of the TaftHartley Act is statutory recognition that there are circumstances in which employers may
lawfully resort to the lockout as an economic weapon." NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union,
353 U.S. 87, 92-93 (1957).
151 See note 9 supra.
152 See note 7 supra.
153 The issue had produced diversity of views among the circuits before American Ship
Building was decided. Compare NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886 (5th
Cir. 1962) (lockout held lawful despite no impasse), with Utah Plumbing & Heating
Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1961) (held unlawful); Quaker State
Oil Ref. Corp. v. NLRB, 270 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 917 (1959)
(held unlawful). See also Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 576, 582 (7th
Cir. 1951), 204 F.2d 529, 531 (7th Cir. 1953) discussed at note 138 supra.
154 346 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1965).
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Sixth Circuit had before it the following facts. The Association, comprised
of the two newspapers published in Detroit, the News and the Free Press,
had been formed years before for the purpose of negotiating and administering labor contracts and handling the labor relations of members. The
Association did not, however, bargain on a multiemployer basis with the
Teamsters Union, here involved; contracts with the Teamsters had
traditionally been negotiated on an individual-unit basis. The Teamsters
struck the Free Press over contract renewal demands, and the News, with
which the union was simultaneously bargaining, locked out its employees
shortly thereafter in accordance with a prior agreement to this effect with
the Free Press. At the time of the lockout, the negotiations between the
union and the News had apparently not reached a formal impasse,
although it was clear that the crucial issues which prompted the Free
Press strike existed also with respect to the negotiations with the News
and that the two newspapers had agreed, prior to the strike against the
Free Press, that neither would yield on these matters. The Board had
found the News guilty, on these facts, of violating sections 8(a) (1) and
(3) by reason of its lockout. 15 5 The Sixth Circuit, with dubious wisdom,
denied the Board's niotion for remand of the case for further consideration in the light of the intervening American Ship Building decision, thus
depriving the primary tribunal of the first opportunity to pass upon the
pre-impasse question. 56 The court then proceeded, rather summarily, to
refuse enforcement of the Board's order against the News, because of the
absence of any evidence or finding that the employer was motivated by
hostility to the union or to collective bargaining. The court pertinently
stated: "While in American Ship Building there was an impasse in the
negotiations between the employer and the union, we do not think the
teaching of that case merely adds another exception to the Board's
category of permissible lockouts." 57 Quoting American Ship Building,
the court further concluded "that where the intention proven is merely to
bring about a settlement of a labor dispute on favorable terms, no viola158
tion of § 8(a) (3) is shown.'
While the Sixth Circuit's simplistic treatment of the pre-impasse question may, indeed, carry the day with the Board, it is worth noting that
the case is distinguishable on its facts from others which may be expected
to confront the Board. First, there may have been an impasse in the
negotiations between the union and the Free Press. In any event, the
155 Evening News Ass'n, 145 N.L.R.B. 996 (1964).
156 The Board's motion for remand was granted under somewhat similar circumstances
in Topeka Grocers Management Ass'n v. NLRB, 52 CCH Lab. Cas. II 16,535, 59 L.R.R.M.
2736 (10th Cir. June 16, 1965).
157 Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 527, 530 (6th Cir. 1965).
258

Id. at 531.
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strike against the Free Press was, for lockout purposes, the equivalent of
an impasse. Second, the News was, in a way, party to this impasse or
its equivalent, the strike, by reason of its agreement with the Free Press
to stand fast on certain crucial issues during the simultaneous bargaining
sessions with the union. Third, the situation was much akin to that in
Buffalo Linen, in substance if not in technical form, and might have been
disposed of under that doctrine, a contention strenuously urged by the
News before the Board. 59
Where all of this leaves us is a nice question-one I confidently expect
the Supreme Court to delay answering, if, indeed, it ever has need to
answer it at all, until sufficient experience accumulates to permit a
sounder basis for judgment than is presently available.
(2) The Hiringof Temporary Replacements After a BargainingLockout
A second question left unanswered in American Ship Building and
Brown Food may be framed in this fashion: May a single employer who
locks out after impasse, solely for bargaining leverage, hire temporary
replacements? In his concurring opinion in American Ship Building,
Justice White said that the answer of the majority, by implication, was
yes. This sufficiently nettled Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, that he
added the following footnote to his opinion:
Contrary to the views expressed in a concurring opinion filed in this case,
we intimate no view whatever as to the consequences which would follow
had the employer replaced
his employees with permanent replacements or
even temporary help.' 60
Justice White's inference that the majority would sanction the hiring
of temporary replacements was partially based upon the majority's decision in Brown Food. This decision does not, however, resolve the question
because, as Justice White himself pointed out in his dissent, the decision
of the Court was premised, in part at least, on a parity of treatment of
the nonstruck and struck employers, the struck employer having hired
temporary replacements. The question of parity is, of course, irrelevant in
the single-employer situation.
The hiring of temporary replacements by the single employer therefore
presents to the Board the old balancing problem as now reformulated,
assuming no independent evidence of unlawful intent. The two questions
for the Board are: (1) Does the hiring of temporary replacements serve a
159 The News argued, first, that it was, in fact, engaged in joint or multiemployer bargaining with the Teamsters, Evening News Ass'n, 145 N.L.R.B. 996, 1018-20 (1964); second, that,
in any event, the Buffalo Linen doctrine should be extended to cover a "lockout by employers
over common issues." Id. at 1021.
160 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 308 n.8 (1965).
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"significant economic purpose" of the employer?, (2) If it does, is the
action nonetheless "so destructive of employee rights" as not to be
tolerated under the labor statute? The first question would seem, at first
impression, to require an answer favoring the employer. His purpose is
ostensibly to continue operations. This purpose might even be claimed to
be more consistent with the fundamental goal of the national labor policy
than the bargaining lockout itself, since whereas the lockout interrupts
the flow of commerce, the hiring of replacements mitigates the interruption. Moreover, since the replacements are temporary, the second question
may also be answered in a manner favoring the employer, namely that
the prejudice to the rights of the locked-out employees is too slight to
trigger the Erie Resistor formula permitting "truncated inquiry into
employer motivation."
I am not content, however, to leave the matter at this, since such would
entail equating the locking-out employer with a struck employer. There
are at least two differences between the hiring of replacements by a struck
employer and a locking-out employer: First, the struck employer is acting
defensively, whereas the employer who locks out-the "impatient warrior" 1 61 --bears the onus of casting the first stone. The defensive character
of the struck employer's hiring of replacements was the very basis for
recognition of his replacement right.1 6 And, indeed, in Brown Food the
Court found the "compelling inference" from the hiring of temporary
replacements to be "that this was all part and parcel of respondents'
defensive measure to preserve the multiemployer group in the face of the
whipsaw strike. 163 Second, the struck employer who is seeking to continue operations during a strike by hiring nonunion replacements is not
permitted, while he is so hiring, to refuse work to strikers who abandon
the union cause. Such a course of action would constitute a reprisal for
the exercise of the section 7 right to engage in concerted activities, an
interference with the section 7 right to refrain from engaging in such
activities, and, in Justice White's phrase, "the prototype of discrimination
under Section 8(a) (3)." '64 In the case of the lockout, all of the regular
employees desire to continue work. To deny them work which is then offered to nonunion replacements, solely because of their collective bargain161 This provocative sobriquet is borrowed from Duvin, "The Bargaining Lockout: An
Impatient Warrior," 40 Notre Dame Law. 137 (1965).
162 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938): "Nor was it an unfair
labor practice to replace the striking employees with others in an effort to carry on the
business ....
[I]t does not follow [from § 13's express protection of the right to strike]
that an employer, guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has lost the right to protect
and continue his business by supplying places left vacant by strikers."
163 NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 284 (1965).
164 Id. at 297, citing Mackay Radio, supra note 162.
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ing efforts, would seem clearly discriminatory and in the nature of reprisal
for section 7 activities.
On the other hand, if the strategy of the lockout is not to be diluted,
the employer must be permitted to hire replacements, if at all, from
outside the ranks of his regular employees. This was precisely what
happened in Brown Food, of course, in the multiemployer, whipsaw
context, and the action was held to be lawful. The Court's reasoning on
this troublesome facet of Brown Food was that any other decision would
have the effect of forcing nonstruck employers into "aiding and abetting
the success of the whipsaw strike."' 6 5 The union had precipitated the shutdown; if the nonstruck employers had been required to utilize any regular
bargaining-unit employees in their efforts to continue operations, to that
extent they would have been required to subsidize the union's whipsaw
tactic. Arguably, what the Supreme Court there intimated was only what
employers have been contending all along with respect to the whipsaw:
"a strike against one is a strike against all."'' 6
This reasoning is obviously not available in the single-employer situation. It may therefore be argued that Brown Food is irrelevant, and that
the single employer who chooses to lock out for bargaining purposes
should resign himself to paying the price of a temporary cessation of
business. Since he is himself responsible for his dilemma with respect to
continued operations, he might fairly be required to take the bitter with
the sweet. Put otherwise, his total conduct-the bargaining lockout plus
the hiring of temporary nonunion replacements-might be said to "carry
its own indicia of unlawful intent." Any other conclusion would entail
subordinating expressly protected employee rights in favor of nonexpressly protected employer interests to a degree not involved in the validation of the bargaining lockout itself. Indeed, the usurpation of congressional power resulting from a sanctioning of the hiring of temporary
nonunion replacements would seem more obvious than the usurpation for
which the Board was condemned in giving per se treatment to the bargaining lockout.
A negative answer to the temporary replacements question would afford
165 Id. at 285.

166 The two dissenting Board members in Brown Food interpreted Buffalo Linen in
precisely this fashion. They said: "Thus, members of an association could require that all
employers be struck, if any; partial-unit strikes were subject to being made full-unit
strikes by the employer's [sic] lockout action. Granting this, it would seem to follow that
temporary replacement of the employees in strike status was well within the employers' rights
under Mackay." John Brown, 137 N.L.R.B. 73, 78 (1962).
The Tenth Circuit was not willing to go that far, in reversing the Board. The court stated:
"However, we do not understand Buffalo Linen to hold, and we do not hold, that a permissible lockout after the initiation of a whipsaw strike places the locked out employees in
the absolute status of the actual strikers." NLRB v. Brown, 319 F.2d 7, 11 (10th Cir. 1963).
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a partial lid for the Pandora's Box of the bargaining lockout. It therefore
will hold appeal for the Board. Perhaps what the Board ought to do in
such captious waters is to keep the partial lid on until mandated by the
courts to the contrary. The mandate from the courts of appeals is likely to
be diverse, whatever the Board decides. By the time the question reaches
the Supreme Court, we should all be better informed for passing judgment.
Another question, closely related to the temporary replacements problem, merits discussion before leaving this matter. Suppose the employer, in
seeking to bring bargaining pressure to bear on the union while at the
same time continuing to operate on a limited scale, engages in a partial
lockout. Does the right recognized in American Ship Building to lock out
all employees in the bargaining unit carry with it the right to lock out
less than all, assuming that those who are locked out are selected on a
nondiscriminatory basis? The answer, at first impression, would seem to
be yes, on the theory that the part is encompassed in the whole. But there
are problems here, too. The employees who are not locked out may refuse
to work, since their colleagues have been deprived of work. To continue
working under such circumstances might be deemed an implementation
of the employer's strategy and therefore an act of disloyalty to the union
and fellow members, the more so since continuing to work would probably
require crossing a picket line established by the locked-out employees. If
the nonlocked-out employees do refuse to work, is this a strike on their
part? If it is a strike, the employer's right to replace them under Mackay
Radio would seem to be triggered. If the nonlocked-out employees do not
refuse to work altogether, but rather do their work in slipshod fashion, is
this an unprotected "slowdown" for which they are subject to discharge? 167 Considering the divisive potential of the partial lockout, might
not the use of it provide the basis for an inference of a purpose on the
part of the employer to create such division among his employees? In
short, does the bargaining lockout present a situation where the whole
does not encompass the part?
Whatever may be said, as a general proposition, of the right of the
employer who locks out for bargaining purposes to continue operations,
whether through use of a skeleton bargaining-unit staff or through use of
temporary outsiders, special circumstances might strengthen his case.
Where, for example, he would suffer peculiar economic loss if certain
services within the ambit of the bargaining unit were not performed
during the lockout-i.e., a loss not typically suffered by one who locks
167

Cf., e.g., Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950).
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out-his right to obtain the performance of such services (e.g., tending a
furnace) would seem too strong to deny. Recognition of such right would
constitute a kind of reverse application of the old "economic justification"
doctrine, here justifying the granting of work rather than the withholding
of it.
(3) The Hiring of Permanent Replacements
A third question left unanswered in American Ship Building and Brown
Food concerns the right of an employer, whether in a single or multiemployer unit, to hire permanent replacements for locked-out employees.
I think this question must surely be answered in the negative in the case.
of the bargaining lockout, and probably also in the case of the multiemployer, defensive lockout.
As to the bargaining lockout, a prime concern left over by American
Ship Building is that such a lockout may be covertly used to defeat
collective bargaining, indeed to break unions. An employer confronted by
a weak union may, while keeping his rhetoric and actions otherwise pure,
precipitate an impasse, lock out his employees for "bargaining" reasons
at a propitious moment, and then destroy the union's majority status by
hiring a sufficient number of permanent replacements. Ironically, this
would be most apt to happen in parts of the country where the national
policy in favor of collective bargaining has been least honored.' If the
hiring of permanent replacements after a lockout cannot be treated by
the Board as unlawful without independent evidence of hostile motivation,
a heavy premium will be placed upon dissemblance. Nor would it seem to
make great sense to measure the lawfulness of the employer's action by
his de facto success or lack thereof in breaking or seriously weakening
the union.' 69
There is nothing in American Ship Building or Brown Food which
168 Demands have been made for congressional investigations of antiunion employers in
the South. Such a request was recently presented by the Industrial Union Department of
the AFL-CIO to the House Labor Committee in connection with hearings on the NLRB
and the law it administers. See 60 Lab. Rel. Rep. 47 (1965) (News and Background Information). Similarly, the Textile Workers Union of America has called for congressional
investigation of "a 'continuing conspiracy' by Southern textile manufacturers to prevent
unionization of their employees," a "conspiracy" said to be "masterminded" by lawyers
specializing in "union-busting" and "aided and abetted in some cases by the local press, the
police and merchants eager to do the bidding of the big textile mill which is usually the
town's major employer." N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1965, p. 24, cois. 2-3 (late city ed.).
169 There is language in both the American Ship Building and Brown Food opinions
indicating a reliance by the Court on the conclusion that in neither of those cases did the
employer action, in fact, either destroy or impair the capacity of the unions for effective
representation. Thus, in American Ship Building the Court observed: "The unions here
involved have vigorously represented the employees since 1952, and there is nothing to
show that their ability to do so has been impaired by the lockout." American Ship Bldg.
Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 309 (1965). For a similar indication in Brown Food, see NLRB
v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 288-90 (1965).
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even arguably controls this question. In both of those cases the employer
made clear that the locked-out employees would be taken back when the
bargaining impasse was resolved. Indeed, in Brown Food the Court relied
heavily upon the temporary character of the nonunion replacements in
reaching the conclusion that the discrimination involved had but "slight"
tendency to discourage union membership.17 0 Even more to the point, the
Court expressly limited the scope of its Brown Food decision by adding
the following footnote:
We do not here decide whether the case would be the same had the struck
employer exercised its prerogative to hire permanent replacements for the
strikers under our rule in [Mackay Radio], and the nonstruck employers
had then hired permanent replacements for their locked-out employees. 17 1
Justice Goldberg, concurring, emphasized that the case would not be the
same. Justice White, dissenting, feared that it would be.
Everything considered, it is predictable that the Board will treat the
permanent replacement situation as falling within the Erie Resistor
exception to the requirement of independent evidence of hostile motivation, in the bargaining lockout and, probably also, multiemployer, defensive lockout situations. While the hiring of permanent replacements may
arguably serve a justifiable employer purpose, its potential for destruction of section 7 rights is sufficiently great to be said to carry "its own
indicia of unlawful intent," as with the granting of superseniority-the
more so since the employer's need for replacements is the product of his
voluntary act in locking out.'72 The situation is much akin to the frequently frowned-upon discharge of workers for the exercise of section 7
rights.1'7
The Board's problem in rationalizing this result may be somewhat
Ibid.
Id. at 292 n.6.
But see Justice Stewart's strong statement suggesting the contrary, in American
Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 169, at 309, quoted at note 132 supra.
173 See, most pertinently, Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950), remanded,
190 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951), on remand, 99 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1952), enforced, 204 F.2d
529 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953). The issue upon which this case was
ultimately resolved was whether the noastruck members of a multiemployer unit had
discharged their employees in response to. a whipsaw strike or merely laid them off temporarily for bargaining leverage. The Board's determination that the employers had discharged their employees and thereby violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (3) was affirmed by the
Seventh Circuit, despite the fact that the "discharged" employees had been taken back
("rehired") after settlement of the dispute over renewal of the contract, and despite the
court's view that a temporary severance or lockout for bargaining purposes would have
been lawful.
The Seventh Circuit said: "it is dearly settled that an employer's discharge of his employees
because of their union affiliations or activities, strike activity included, is an unfair labor
practice, violative of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act." Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB,
190 F.2d 576, 583 (7th Cir. 1951), citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 183 (1941); International Union of
Auto. Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 456-57 (1950).
170
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greater in the multiemployer situation where the struck employer has
hired permanent replacements, since it will here be confronted by the
"parity of treatment" argument, and also its counterpart, that "a strike
against one is a strike against all." The "parity bubble" may burst under
this respiratory pressure, for the only legitimate function of parity is to
preserve the multiemployer bargaining unit. The hiring of permanent
replacements by both struck and nonstruck employers can hardly be said
to give rise to a "compelling inference" that the action is in "defense" of
the multiemployer unit, as the Court found to be the case in Brown
Food,7 4 since such action would threaten the union's majority status and,
with it, the very basis for group bargaining. Moreover, if defense of the
multiemployer unit is the key, as it seems to be, the hiring of permanent
replacements would seem to be justifiable only on the basis of a showing
that temporary replacements were not available. If temporary replacements were found to be available, this should afford a basis, without more,
for an inference of antiunion animus. The "strike against one is a strike
against all" argument, which underlies the parity concern, may be more
1 75
difficult to counter-particularly in view of the Board's recent decision
that the union, like the employer, may withdraw from the multiemployer
unit upon timely notice to such effect. With this option available, the
union, it may be contended, should be held to take the bitter with the
sweet when it decides to continue bargaining on a multiemployer basis
and then utilizes the whipsaw strike. However, if the hiring of permanent
replacements succeeded in destroying or seriously undercutting the
union's majority status, this very success would tend to vitiate Brown
Food as a precedent for the employer since the Court relied heavily there
on the fact that "the resulting harm to employee rights" was "comparatively slight.'

6

In any event, the harm to the statutory rights of the

employees actually replaced could hardly be said to be "slight."
The main difference, analytically, between the bargaining lockout and
174 NLRB v. Brown, supra note 169, at 284.
175 Evening News Ass'n, 1965 CCH NLRB 1111
9712-13 (Sept. 23, 1965) (companion
cases). The Board held that employer-members of a multiemployer bargaining unit violated
§ 8(a) (5) in refusing to bargain on an individual basis with a union which had given
written and unequivocal notice of its withdrawal from the multiemployer unit "before
the date set by the contract for modification, or before the agreed-upon date to begin the
multiemployer negotiations," precisely the same terms upon which withdrawal by an employer
is permitted. Id. 1j9712, at 16,464. In response to the contention that such decision would
deprive the employers of their defensive lockout protection against the whipsaw strike,
the Board stated: "we have no occasion to decide at this time whether a union's withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining followed by its striking fewer than all of the former
employer members of the larger unit would effectively deny to the employers who are not
struck the right to engage in a lockout. That question, among others concerning lockouts,
remains to be decided in light of the recent relevant Supreme Court decisions." Id. II 9712,
at 16,465.
176 NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 289 (1965).
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the multiemployer, defensive lockout lies in the fact that in the latter the
union casts the first stone and, to that extent, is responsible for what
follows. In this respect, the situation in the multiemployer, defensive
lockout is akin to that in the single-employer partial strike. The question
presented may then be framed in this fashion: Should the employer be
held to be entitled to force the usual consequences and risks borne by
strikers upon nonstrikers because the latter belong to the same union or
bargaining unit and, to that extent, may be presumed to be in privity with
the purposes of the strikers? In his Brown Food dissent, Justice White
answered this with an emphatic no:
The Court finds it unnecessary to explain how they [the nonstrikers] are
removed from the explicit protections of the Act, except to say they belong
to the union or the unit the union represents and to assume conclusively
they share its whipsawing purpose. Membership has never quite meant this
before. The Court's justification for this invasion of employee rights by a
member of a multiemployer unit is the employer's right to burden the
union strike fund with all its members to bring economic pressure to bear
on the union. Unfortunately, this reasoning has
177 equal, if not greater, force
in the single employer partial strike situation.
Moreover, as Justice White pointed out in his American Ship Building
concurrence, "the Court fully ignores the most explicit statutory right of
employees 'to refrain from any or all [concerted] activities.' 2;178
Since Justice White was the only member of the Court to address
himself specifically to the troublesome implications of the validation of
the use of temporary nonunion replacements in the multiemployer, defensive lockout situation, and since he shed his light in dissent, we are
left in a heavy murk. The ultimate answer to the right of permanent
replacement in the whipsaw context may turn on the acceptance or nonacceptance of the "strike against one is a strike against all" rationale and
on the extent of the onus the Court is willing to attach to the union and
to those it represents for having cast the first stone. While two dissenting
Board members in Brown Food were apparently willing to carry the
"strike against one is a strike against all" rationale to its logical extreme
177 Id. at 298. With respect to the single-employer partial-strike situation, Justice White

stated:
The struck employer need not continue operations, but if he does, he may not give a
preference to employees not affiliated with the striking union, any more than he may
do so after the strike, for § 7 explicitly and unequivocally protects the right of employees
to engage and not to engage in a concerted activity and § 8(a) (3) dearly prohibits
discrimination which discourages union membership. [Citation of decisions of courts of
appeals.] . . . If dismissing and replacing nonstriking union members at a struck plant
discourages union membership and interferes with concerted activities, I fail to understand how this same conduct at a nonstruck plant, even if in the name of multiemployer
parity and unity, has a different effect on employee rights. Id. at 297.
178 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 326 (1965).
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under Mackay Radio, the Tenth Circuit expressed misgivings.179 The
misgivings seem in order.
(4) The BargainingLockout in First-ContractNegotiations
The final question I want to raise with respect to the decisions of last
March is this: Is the bargaining lockout available to an employer who
has bargained to an impasse in his first contract negotiations with a
newly-certified collective bargaining representative? In both American
Ship Building and Brown Food there was a history of successful bargaining over a period of several years. In each case the Supreme Court emphasized this background in reversing the Board. In neither case, however, did the Court expressly limit its holding so as to apply only to
such a situation. But the "record" in a first-contract case does not as
strongly attest the employer's purity of motive. And the prejudicial
impact upon section 7 rights would seem to be much greater where the
employees have not yet gained the sense of security in the exercise of
their rights which comes with a satisfactory bargaining history. Moreover, the incentive for disingenuous use of the lockout, as a screen for
nipping collective bargaining in the bud, would be greatest here, particularly in areas where industrialization and unionism have lagged. 18 0 It
was the mischievous potential of situations such as this which prompted
Justice Goldberg in American Ship Building to inveigh against the
"quick, definitive formula"'' approach of the majority to the bargaining
lockout, and which prompted Justice White similarly to condemn the
Court's "simple solution" and its "myopic focus" on the employer's
"true motive."' 82 As Justice Goldberg spelled the problem out:
The question of which types of lockout are compatible with the labor
statute is a complex one ....
The types of situation in which an employer might seek to lock out
his employees differ considerably ....

This case presents the situation of

an employer with a long history of union recognition and collective bargaining, confronted with a history of past strikes, who locks out only
after considerable good-faith negotiation involving agreement and compromise on numerous issues, after a bargaining impasse has been reached,
more than a week after the prior contract has expired, and when faced
with the threat of a strike at a time
when he and the property of his
customers can suffer unusual harm.183
In other words, what the bargaining-lockout problems require for
solution, in the judgment of both Justices Goldberg and White, is the very
179 See note 166 supra.
180 See note 168 supra.
181 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 178 at 336.
182 Id. at 325.
183 Id. at 336-37.
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balancing by the Board of the legitimate economic interests of the employer and the statutorily protected rights of the employees which was
endorsed in Buffalo Linen. Vital factors in any such balancing would be
the presence or absence of a bargaining history and the quality of that
history where it exists. The Board may be expected to continue to balance competing interests in subtle lockout cases, albeit on a new basis
which precludes generic per se treatment being given to the bargaining
lockout. The new basis will entail, as I have already indicated, a more
express and detailed inquiry into the nature and extent of the otherwise
legitimate interest which prompts the action of the employer and into
the extent of the invasion of such into employee rights. This approach
will preclude, in my judgment, the Board's treating a bargaining lockout
or threat thereof in a first-contract negotiation as a per se violation of
the act, but it will not preclude the Board's treating such a lockout less
favorably than where a successful history of past negotiations exists.
Less independent evidence of antiunion animus should be required by
the reviewing courts here than would have sufficed in the more favorable
contexts of American Ship Building and Brown Food.
CONCLUSION

It is untenable to assume that the Board may no longer balance conflicting legitimate interests of employers, employees, and, I might add,
the public. In a sense, this is merely a definition of the peculiarly necessary function of an administrative agency applying a broadly-phrased
statute to complex, fluid problems. It is clear, however, that the Board's
balancing in the future must be framed in new semantics, more tightly
formulated than was previously the case, with attendant implications
as to the nature and depth of the inquiry.
The Court's opinions in American Ship Building and Brown Food
must be read in the light of the circumstances 'there involved. So read,
the sweeping generalizations about sections 8(a) (1) and (3) and the
Board's balancing power may be reduced to the following: (1) The
Board made a mistake of law in interpreting the statute so as to render
all bargaining lockouts unlawful. (2) The Board made a correlative
mistake in performing its balancing function by giving the bargaining
lockout a per se weight in the scales, instead of evaluating the particular
employer conduct in the total factual and statutory context and then carefully spelling out its findings and reasoning. In a sense, the Board's
error was in failing to perform its proper balancing function at all, by
treating the bargaining lockout as unlawful whatever the circumstances.
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(3) In making these correlative mistakes, the Board arrogated to itself
congressional power, rather than acting like an administrative agency.
More specifically, the Board sought to impose its own ideas as to a proper
balance of bargaining power between the parties, forgetting the lesson
of the Insurance Agents case with respect to per se treatment of the
"slowdown" or "on-the-job strike." (4) The requirement that the Board
justify its section 8(a)(1) and (3) orders either on the basis of independent evidence of hostile motivation or on the basis of conduct
"so destructive of employee rights" and/or "so devoid of significant
economic purpose" as to "carry its own indicia of unlawful intent" is
intended to discourage the Board's Feasy out" reliance on per se rules,
particularly where the economic pressures so essential to free collective
bargaining are in issue. (5) There is room for a properly-circumscribed
exercise of balancing power by the Board, including the drawing of
rational inferences, within the ambit of the foregoing.
The actual decisions of last March, on the facts presented, make sense.
The broad, murky language and rationale will, however, haunt the Board,
courts, and Bar for some time to come.

